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Restorative Justice in Theory: 
Addressing the Shortcomings of Retributive Justice and 








In the following pages, restorative justice is discussed in both 
theoretical and practical terms. The difficulties inherent to defining 
restorative justice are discussed and the United Nations’ definition is 
accepted for the following analysis. A rights-based criticism of 
restorative justice is outlined and revealed as a weak counterargument 
when considered. The value of several restorative justice processes, 
namely truth commissions and family/community circles, are 
demonstrated to be useful forms of creating justice and improving 
communal relationships after an offense. Ultimately, restorative 
justice processes are revealed as having the potential to contribute to 




Forgiveness…is an act that joins moral truth, forbearance, 
empathy, and commitment to repair a fractured human 
relation. Such a combination calls for a collective turning 
from the past that neither ignores past evil nor excuses it, that 
neither overlooks justice nor reduces justice to revenge, that 
insists on the humanity of enemies even in their commission 
of dehumanizing deeds, and that values the justice that 
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restores political community above the justice that destroys 
it.1 
 
The above quotation was taken from Donald Shriver’s An Ethic for 
Enemies. In the opinion of this essay’s author, Shriver’s words, though 
speaking specifically of forgiveness of one’s enemies, appropriately 
establish the lens through which the following analysis of restorative 
justice theory should be viewed—despite the fact that forgiveness 
itself is not necessarily a goal of restorative justice. Present in the 
above quotation are various themes and values inherent to any 
restorative justice process: truth, forbearance, responsibility, respect 
for all involved, and the necessity of a collective will to restore, to the 
extent possible, the relationships harmed by an offense—committed 
by an individual against another individual or group of individuals—
to a mutually amicable status.  
In North America and much of the Western World, the 
manner in which our institutions establish justice is characteristically 
retributive. They are offender-focused. They view crimes as 
violations of state law, rather than as against victims. Justice is 
exacted punitively: a sentence is forced upon a defender that is 
intended to punish the offender, rather than to right the wrongs 
created by the offense. However, as A. Verne McArthur argues in his 
book, Coming Out Cold: Community Reentry from a State Reformatory, in 
which he focuses on the shortcomings of reform efforts in a 
retributive justice system, crime and delinquency are symptomatic of 
greater societal failures and disorganization at a community level as 
well as at an individual level.2 He writes that justice must be 
reorganized as a means to an end—that end being the building or 
rebuilding of relationships between offender, victim, and their 
community. Restorative justice, and the principles and values by 
which it is guided, exists as a theoretical, and indeed practical, means 
of addressing the shortcomings of a retributive justice system.  
                                                 
1 Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge (London: Routledge, 2002), 80. 
2 A. Verne McArthur, Coming Out Cold: Community Reentry from a State Reformatory 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1974), 3.  
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In the following pages, I discuss restorative justice in both 
theoretical and practical contexts. I begin by defining restorative 
justice and outlining the principles and values by which it is guided, 
and the objectives that it aims to achieve. I demonstrate that 
restorative justice is far from a novel idea, but rather has been present 
for some time in many indigenous cultures around the world. 
Restorative justice will be discussed in comparison to retributive 
justice, in order to reveal both its strengths and weaknesses as a 
model for justice in a modern setting. Ultimately, it will be argued 
that restorative justice, as it aims to establish or reestablish harmony 
following a situation where an offense, minor or major, is given, 
exists as an appropriate framework for addressing the shortcomings 
of retributive justice models. Processes and mechanisms of 
restorative justice, and specific cases in which they were used, are 
discussed in order to demonstrate that restorative justice is a valuable 
and practical model for justice. 
 We must begin by determining a definition of restorative 
justice. Howard Zehr notes that a consensus has yet to be reached 
regarding such a definition, even among scholars whose primary field 
of research is restorative justice.3  Further, Amy Levad argues that 
three problems arise in any attempt to define restorative justice. First, 
the programs, to be discussed in greater detail below, which can be 
encompassed by the label of restorative justice are extensive and 
diverse, making the definitional process more complex. Second, the 
development of these programs in North America, especially the 
United States, has occurred in tandem with a rise in punitive 
approaches to sentencing. This has forced restorative programs to 
adopt more punitive elements, and, therefore, has contributed to a 
distortion of what truly constitutes restorative justice. Last, 
restorative justice has been popularized in recent decades alongside 
other reformative efforts. Transformative justice, for example, also 
seeks to reform the current retributive model. Levad argues that this 
competition between different models of justice, which possess 
                                                 
3 Howard Zehr, The Little Book of Restorative Justice (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 
2002), 36. 
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similar elements—each seek to correct underlying inequalities in 
society—has led many to view them as identical or overlapping. This, 
too, hinders the consensus-building process concerning a definition 
of restorative justice.4 
In order to overcome this hindrance, it is useful to define 
restorative justice in theoretical terms, with consultation of multiple 
sources. For the purpose of this essay, such a definition must, at the 
least, outline the parties involved in restorative justice processes, 
consider the values upon which restorative justice is based, and also 
go beyond what restorative justice is to describe what restorative 
justice is not. The definition of restorative justice utilized in this essay 
will, therefore, be defined both positively and negatively.  
Levad is critical of the following definition, offered by Zehr: 
“a process to involve, to the extent possible, those who have a stake 
in a specific offense and to collectively identify and address harms, 
needs, and obligations, in order to heal and put things as right as 
possible.”5 This definition does well to outline the necessity of 
involving the impacted parties, as well as to include that the goal of 
the process is to amend the harms of the offense. However, Levad 
argues that Zehr’s definition fails to place limits on the solutions that 
arise from restorative justice processes. She notes that these 
processes can result in wholly retributive outcomes and that any 
definition of restorative justice should place limits on the outcomes 
as much as on the processes. In place of Zehr’s definition, Levad 
adopts the definition set out by Gordon Bazemore and Lode 
Walgrave: “every action that is primarily oriented to doing justice by 
repairing the harm that has been caused by a crime.”6 This definition, 
however, is problematic due to its broadness and does little to 
address the difficulties with defining restorative justice which she 
outlines and are listed above. Though her criticism is correct, she 
accepts an alternative definition that allows for too much 
interpretation.  
                                                 
4 Amy Levad, Restorative Justice: Theories and Practices of Moral Imagination (El Paso: 
LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2012), 101. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid., 102. 
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The United Nations’ (UN) Office on Drugs and Crime offers 
a much more encompassing definition in its publication “Handbook 
on Restorative Justice Programmes”: “Restorative justice is an 
approach to problem solving that, in its various forms, involves the 
victim, the offender, their social networks, justice agencies and the 
community.”7 Further,  
 
Restorative justice refers to a process for resolving crime by 
focusing on redressing the harm done to the victims, holding 
offenders accountable for their actions and, often also, 
engaging the community in the resolution of that conflict. 
Participation of the parties is an essential part of the process 
that emphasizes relationship building, reconciliation and the 
development of agreements around a desired outcome 
between victims and offender.8 
 
This definition is more appropriate than those mentioned above 
because of its specification of the parties involved and its 
requirement that both the processes and the outcomes be reflective 
of the values of restorative justice. That the outcomes must focus on 
“redressing the harm done” effectively filters out retributive and 
rehabilitative programs that, as Levad writes, “instead follow the 
normative guides of balancing the scales of justice or treating the 
illness of offenders.”9 Furthermore, this definition aligns with the 
three principles most common to the literature surrounding 
restorative justice, outlined by Daniel Van Ness and Karen Heetderks 
Strong:  
1) Justice requires that we work to restore those who have 
been injured: victims, communities, and even offenders; 2) 
those most directly involved and affected by crime – victims, 
offenders, and community – should have the opportunity to 
participate as fully in the response as they wish; and 3) while 
                                                 
7 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Restorative Justice 
Programmes, Criminal Justice Handbook Series (New York: United Nations, 2006), 6. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Levad, Restorative Justice, 105. 
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the government is responsible for preserving a just public 
order, the community’s role in establishing and maintaining a 
just peace must be given special significance.10 
 
Because of its detail and agreement with the values, to be discussed in 
the following section, and principles of restorative justice, it is the 
UN definition of restorative justice that is utilized in this essay. 
At this juncture, having determined an appropriate definition 
upon which to base the present discussion, it is important that we 
reach beyond a basic description of the core aspects of restorative 
justice and explore the values upon which it is based. Participation, 
respect, community empowerment, flexibility and responsiveness of 
processes and outcomes, and commitment to the agreed upon 
solution are all values inherent to models of restorative justice.  
Central to restorative justice is the idea that people can be 
empowered through participation. Victims, offenders, and the 
community affected by their interaction should all contribute to the 
process of restoring harmony following an offense. Proponents of 
restorative justice argue that, by involving all of those affected by a 
given offense in the resolution process, the individuals most affected 
can adopt the most appropriate and mutually accepted and beneficial 
means of conflict resolution.11 Respect, too, is essential. It is 
important that any restorative justice process seek to reestablish the 
humanity of all those involved. Indeed, the recognition of each 
person’s inherent value, as a human being and a member of a given 
community, justifies the application of restorative justice processes—
which aim to involve all those affected by the offence to determine a 
mutually agreeable solution to the problem. It is also important that 
these solutions maintain a level of flexibility so that unforeseen 
complications or setbacks can be addressed without hindrance or 
protest. Restorative processes, therefore, are by their very nature 
contingent. Lastly, those involved in these processes must commit to 
the agreed upon solution. In theory, if all affected parties are involved 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 106. 
11 United Nations, Handbook, 8. 
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in determining a method of resolution, each will have an increased 
interest in seeing that the resolution succeeds. This value also ensures 
that all parties are, and feel as if they are, being fairly treated, and 
their views adequately considered. These values require that the needs 
of those involved are considered and that their roles in the process 
are ensured.12 
There are a number of restorative justice initiatives that will 
be mentioned throughout this essay. I give them brief mention here, 
but they will be described in greater detail as they are mentioned in 
the forthcoming analysis. Restorative justice initiatives include: 
victim-offender mediation, community and family group conferences, 
sentencing circles, peacemaking circles, restorative cautioning, 
regulatory restorative justice, reparative probation and community 
boards and panels, and truth and reconciliation commissions.13  
It is important to note that theories of restorative justice are 
heavily impacted by their cultural roots. Restorative forms of justice 
have long existed within indigenous cultures and continue to be 
practiced within indigenous communities today. Jane Dickson-
Gilmore and Carol La Prairie write that restorative justice has been 
adopted and maintained by indigenous communities as a result of the 
conscious effort to oppose mainstream retributive justice.14 In its 
early conceptions, restorative justice was focused on increasing the 
level of participation in the judicial process. The aim of those who 
adopted restorative justice, it seems, was to move criminal justice 
away from “its hierarchical, adjudicative focus to a more balanced, 
participatory focus on resolving conflicts and restoring 
relationships.”15 Aboriginal communities developed independent 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 8-9. 
13 Andrew Ashworth, “Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward for Criminal 
Justice?” in Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, edited by Eugene McLaughlin, Ross 
Fergusson, Gordon Hughes, and Louise Westmarland (London: Sage Publications, 
2003), 165-166; and The United Nations, Handbook, 14-15. 
14 Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol La Prairie, Will the Circle be Unbroken? Aboriginal 
Communities, Restorative Justice, and the Challenges of Conflict and Change (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2005), 91. 
15 Ibid. 
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restorative justice processes in order to reassert their independence 
and limit the effects on their communities of racially and culturally 
biased laws. Though these initiatives have been heavily influenced by 
the retributive systems with which they compete, their persistence 
and success as institutions are a testament to the viability of 
restorative justice initiatives.  
The most well-known restorative practices utilized by First 
Nations communities in Canada are the healing circle and the 
sentencing circle. In both, all participants sit in a circle and discuss 
the offense in order to determine an amicable means to redress 
harms done. These circles are a place for taking responsibility and for 
reestablishing order to relationships.16 The importance of the circle 
for these communities goes beyond practical necessity. The circle has 
cultural significance that aligns with the values of restorative justice. 
Jane Dickson-Gilmore and Carol La Prairie elaborate:  
The circle has long been viewed as a symbol of importance 
and empowerment among many First Nations…As informed 
by the circle, these [restorative] initiatives assert the power of 
its central attributes, namely, balance, equality, and a holistic 
approach to life…Within the circle…inequalities are broken 
down, as is the common reticence that impedes the sharing of 
information about conflict.17 
 
The introduction of indigenous culture to the judicial process serves 
the added function of restoring the community’s confidence in the 
judicial process, as well as empowering these communities to commit 
to a collective effort to maintain harmony. 
Moving toward a discussion of restorative justice in theory as 
it has developed in recent decades, it is perhaps best to begin, as do 
Eugene Mcglaughlin et al. and Andrew Woolford in their respective 
publications, with the work of Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie. 
Christie, in his 1977 paper, “Conflicts as Property,” argues that 
conflict, of which crime is a form, exists as a valuable resource that 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 132. 
17 Ibid., 131. 
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can belong to someone, be sold to others, and be stolen.18 Christie 
argues that governments, he wrote of Scandinavian countries but his 
analysis applies to any government that controls the means of justice, 
have taken this resource from the communities in which crimes 
occur. By taking over the mechanisms for prosecution and 
conceptualizing crimes as having been committed against the state, 
making the state the victim rather than the individual or community, 
the community from which they are taken suffers a great loss.19 
These communities are no longer forced to confront their 
shortcomings and, therefore, are not given the opportunity to redress 
them. To remedy this, Christie suggests that the power to resolve 
harms done through criminal acts should be returned to the 
communities in which they occur.20 This can be accomplished, he 
writes, by establishing victim-oriented and community-based courts 
that would offer community members greater input into the judicial 
process.21 
Restorative justice theory advanced in the late 1980s and early 
1990s through the separate works of Howard Zehr and John 
Braithwaite. Both argued for a paradigm shift from the current 
retributive forms of justice present to Western societies. Zehr viewed 
restorative justice as the opposite of retributive justice, although his 
perspective on this particular method of framing restorative justice 
has since changed. Consequently, a theory of restorative justice 
developed that was based on what it was not—namely, retributive 
justice—rather than what it was.22 Andrew Woolford writes that this 
had the additional effect of characterizing restorative justice as a 
reactive model of justice.23 
                                                 
18 Andrew Woolford, The Politics of Restorative Justice: A Critical Introduction (Halifax 
and Winnipeg: Fernwood Publishing, 2009), 48. 
19 Nils Christie, “Conflict as Property,” in Restorative Justice: Critical Issues, Eugene 
McLaughlin, Ross Fergusson, Gordon Hughes, and Louise Westmarland, ed. 
(London: Sage Publications, 2003), 25-26. 
20 Ibid., 27-28. 
21 Woolford, The Politics of Restorative Justice, 48. 
22 Ibid., 50. 
23 Ibid. 
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Braithwaite, writing in the late 1980s, helped to insert 
restorative ideals within existing criminological theory. His work 
addressed the issues associated with the stigmatization and labeling 
that accompanies those found guilty or accused of crimes. He 
revealed that the current retributive justice system may, in fact, 
further commit offenders to a criminal lifestyle.24 The prosecution 
process devalued the offender as a member of society and limited his 
ability to positively contribute to his community in the future. In 
place of this detrimental system, Braithwaite suggested the use of 
“reintegration ceremonies” that would focus condemnation on the 
act rather than the actor.25 The effect of these ceremonies is that the 
action is not associated with the character of the individual. The 
offender is able to face the shame of his actions and to move on 
from that shame with a full understanding of how his actions harmed 
others. Commenting on Braithwaite’s work, Dickinson-Gilmore and 
La Prairie write that stigmatization is harmful as it is accompanied by 
social exclusion, while shame is accompanied by social reintegration. 
Braithwaite’s work, like Zehr’s, contributed to the further 
development of a restorative justice theory, as well as restorative 
justice processes, by demonstrating its worth as a remedy to the 
shortcomings of retributive justice. 
Braithwaite and Philip Petit furthered this theory by outlining 
the roles of the state and local communities in a restorative system. 
They write that the state is responsible for maintaining the political 
space needed in order for community-based courts to operate, while 
simultaneously ensuring that the legal rights of participants are not 
being violated. The state, then, would have the ability to intervene 
wherever community-based courts violated the rights of 
participants.26 This was labeled by its authors as the republican theory 
of restorative justice because, as Lode Walgrave writes, the theory 
"synthesizes the legal institutional dimension (the objective rights and 
freedoms that are legally defined) and the informal relational 
                                                 
24 Ibid.  
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 53. 
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dimension (the subjective assurance that others will respect these 
rights and freedoms).”27  
Furthermore, Albert Dzur and Susan Olsen argue that 
theories of restorative justice should be linked with theories of direct 
democracy. Theories of direct democracy encourage the participation 
of any and all individuals in the political decision-making process. 
This means involving each individual in the debate over a given 
proposal, as well as in the ultimate decision whether to adopt said 
proposal. Dzur and Olsen encourage proponents of restorative 
justice to increase the communicative potential of restorative justice 
by adopting the values of direct democracy: open and fair 
participation.28 
These early works led Heather Strang and Braithwaite to 
identify two different conceptions of restorative justice: a process 
conception, and a values conception. The process conception views 
restorative justice as a process that brings together all of the relevant 
stakeholders, those affected by some harm, to resolve conflict in a 
mutually agreeable fashion.29 In the second view, the values 
conception, restorative justice is contrasted with retributive justice. 
Restorative justice values healing over punishment and therefore 
rejects punitive measures. Perhaps it is best to utilize the example 
given by the authors to reveal the difference between the two 
conceptions: 
Someone…committed to a process definition might say that 
while a family group conference is a restorative justice 
process, a mediation between a single victim and a single 
offender is not – because in the latter there is no circle that 
includes or even invites all 
stakeholders…Someone…committed to a values conception 
of restorative justice might say that a community conference 
that sits in a circle and then decides to cane or incarcerate a 
                                                 
27 Lode Walgrave, Restorative Justice, Self-interest and Responsible Citizenship 
(Cullompton: Willan, 2008), 140. 
28 Ibid., 53-54. 
29 Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Civil Society 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. 
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child…is not restorative justice. In contrast, victim-offender 
mediation satisfies the values definition of restorative 
justice.30 
 
Strang and Braithwaite, however, encourage proponents of 
restorative justice to adopt both restorative processes and restorative 
values for a more encompassing and, necessarily, contingent 
development of restorative justice practices.31 The wholesale 
exclusion of punitive measures from restorative processes is as 
undesirable as the violation of privacy for the sake of ensuring 
maximum participation. Each case brought before a restorative court 
will require a certain amount of improvisation of the restorative 
processes. 
The scholarly works mentioned above are the early major 
contributors to the development of restorative justice theory. They 
have theorized the principles upon which restorative justice is built, 
adopting practices and principles of justice present in indigenous 
cultures and applying them as remedies to the shortcomings of 
modern retributive justice systems.  
Though restorative justice has emerged as a capable 
alternative to retributive justice models in many contexts, it is not 
immune to criticism. Andrew Ashworth offers a human-rights-based 
critique of restorative justice’s ability to replace retributive forms of 
justice in criminal matters.32 The essence of his argument is that 
restorative justice models violate three principles of international 
human rights law: “the principle of independence and impartiality, 
the principle of proportionality, and the principle of compensation 
for wrongs.”33 
First, Ashworth argues that international laws, such as that 
outlined in Article 6.1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, guarantee any offender the right to a fair hearing by an 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 2. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Andrew Ashworth, “Restorative Justice: the Way forward for Criminal Justice?” 
164-181. 
33 Ibid., 171. 
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independent and impartial tribunal.34 He states that the involvement 
of the victim in the restorative judicial process undermines the 
independence of the tribunal, and is therefore a violation of 
international human rights law.35 Proponents of restorative justice 
confront this criticism by calling into question the value of 
impartiality and objectivity. Many argue that the e objectivity and 
impartiality that result, in practice, in a retributive system are much 
too impersonal. This, however, does little to undermine the criticism 
as it is an argument against the value of retributive justice rather than 
an argument for restorative justice—a recurring theme in arguments 
offered by proponents of restorative justice. 
There are cases, however, where impartiality and 
independence are difficult to establish. For example, in the aftermath 
of a civil war in which atrocities were committed by both sides, and 
in which neither side emerged as victorious, impartiality will be 
difficult to establish in the prosecution of any individual for 
committing atrocities. In this context, it may be useful to adopt 
restorative justice processes to redress the harms done by these 
individuals and aid in reconciliation, even if these individuals will not 
be punished as a result of these processes. Such an argument has 
been offered by Joanna R. Quinn. Focusing on the use of truth 
commissions as a restorative justice initiative, Quinn writes that truth 
commissions are able to foster aspects of reconciliation. To clarify, 
according to Quinn, a truth commission is an initiative which 
“provides a forum in which a society can learn about the abuses of 
the past.”36 Moreover, a truth commission adopts the primary task of 
collecting “information about such abuses and to compile this 
information to produce a coherent account of the history of that 
society.”37 Therefore, in circumstances where the desire or ability to 
prosecute perpetrators is lacking, restorative justice initiatives such as 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 172.  
36 Joanna R. Quinn, “Are Truth Commissions Useful in Promoting Restorative 
Justice?” in Crosscurrents: International Relations, 4th ed., ed. Mark Charlton (Toronto: 
Nelson Canada, 2005), 404. 
37 Ibid. 
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the truth commission can reconcile individuals and communities 
within society that have been factionalized by the conflict. 
Restorative initiatives can provide a means to reconciliation in 
contexts where impartiality and independence of tribunals can not be 
guaranteed. 
 The second rights-based criticism leveled against restorative 
justice concerns proportionality of outcomes. Ashworth argues that 
the proportionality of outcomes is contingent on the individual will 
of the victim. Some will be vindictive, others forgiving. Restorative 
justice can not guarantee consistency in outcomes. In contrast, 
retributive justice systems are better equipped to create a consistent 
sentencing scheme, as courts are compelled to rely on precedent in 
justifying their deliberations.38 Though this is true in many contexts, 
this argument does not hold for unprecedented situations—
redressing the harms caused by Indian Residential Schools in Canada 
is an example. In such situations, restorative justice initiatives prove 
their worth. As Quinn notes, truth commissions can be adjusted in 
order to address the needs of a given situation.39 Though she refers to 
truth commissions specifically, this flexibility is reflective of the 
values inherent to restorative justice theory and practice in general. 
Further, this flexibility allows restorative processes to account for all 
of the aspects of a given offense when determining outcomes. There 
are, therefore, circumstances wherein, from a legal and judicial 
perspective, restorative processes are preferable to retributive 
processes. 
 Ashworth’s third critique concerns the principle of 
compensation for wrongs. He argues that the primary concern of 
victims is not the punishment of the offender, but rather that he be 
compensated for harms inflicted upon him by the offender.40 By his 
argument, the victim’s interest in the offender’s punishment is no 
greater than any other member of the community. This criticism 
neglects the required participation of community members in the 
                                                 
38 Ashworth, “Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward?” 172. 
39 Quinn, “Are Truth Commissions Useful?” 405. 
40 Ashworth, “Is Restorative Justice the Way Forward?” 173. 
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restorative process. Moreover, it assumes that restorative justice is 
absolutely opposed to consideration of precedent when determining 
length and harshness of punishment. As is previously mentioned in 
this essay, Strang and Braithwaite argue that restorative justice in 
practice should not deal in absolutes, but rather be open to 
consideration of any and all suggestions that may aid in the process 
of redressing harms. The assertion made by Ashworth that 
community members have as much an interest in the punishment of 
offenders as do victims is hardly relevant as a criticism of restorative 
justice because inclusion of the community’s views is an essential 
aspect of restorative processes.  
 In the pages above, restorative justice, in theory, has been 
portrayed as an alternative to retributive justice. It was demonstrated 
that restorative justice has gained traction within aboriginal 
communities as it is reflective of these communities’ values. 
Furthermore, a human rights-based critique was leveled against 
restorative justice theories. Despite these criticisms, restorative justice 
maintains its worth as an alternative to retributive justice in both 
mundane, meaning common criminal trials, and extreme 
circumstances, referring to post-conflict resolution following 
conflicts wherein large-scale atrocities have occurred. This worth has 
been widely acknowledged by Western societies, as restorative forms 
of justice have begun to gain prominence in juvenile justice systems 
throughout Europe, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.  
 Australia and New Zealand, particularly, have recognized the 
value of restorative justice. Their adoption of family group 
conferencing in place of court processes when dealing with youths 
has helped reduce the rate of recidivism in these states.41 Family 
group conferencing is a process of restorative justice that involves the 
offender, the victim, and their families in determining an appropriate 
remedy to wrongs committed. This solution is suggested to a judge 
who acts as the ultimate arbiter of justice. The most common 
                                                 
41 Loraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris, “Restorative Youth Justice: the last 
Vestiges of Welfare?” in Youth Justice: Critical Readings, edited by John Muncie, 
Gordon Hughes, and Eugene McLaughlin (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 244-
245. 
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outcomes are apologies and community involvement.42 Young 
offenders that claimed to have had a positive experience with 
conferencing—those who took the process seriously by confronting 
their past and claiming responsibility for their actions—have 
overwhelmingly avoided reoffending.43 
In this, and in the use of truth commissions in the aftermath 
of atrocities, the value of restorative forms of justice are revealed, as 
is the ability of restorative principles to be translated from theory into 
practice. Restorative justice has the ability to address the 
shortcomings of retributive justice and to improve the effectiveness 
of the justice system as a means of restoring harmony to 
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